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Abstract 
Anxiety and depression disorders are the biggest mental health hazards of our time and in many 
ways closely related. The first anxiety disorder episodes emerge during childhood, while the 
first depression episodes more typically emerge in adolescence. Such early episodes are highly 
predictive for lifespan developments. This chapter reviews literature on dynamic system 
perspectives on anxiety and depression across scales of temporal resolution, from affect and 
highly contextualized emotion episodes to more persistent moods that evaluate the world as a 
whole, and the personality traits anxiety and depression that capture thematic recurrences of 
feelings, thoughts and behavior along the lifespan and how people talk about themselves. These 
various processes are intimately connected via their self-organizing and dynamic nature and 
circular causality, which demonstrates how dynamic system perspectives can help us to 
understand anxiety and depression across the lifespan.    
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“Sherrington (…) thought that the brain worked like a telegraph system. Freud often 
compared the brain to hydraulic and electro-magnetic systems. Leibniz compared it to 
a mill, and I am told the ancient Greeks thought the brain functions like a catapult. At 
present, obviously, the metaphor is the digital computer.”            
Searle (1984, p. 44). 
 
Anxiety and depression disorders are the biggest mental health hazards of our time, and first 
episodes often emerge during childhood and adolescence (Merikangas et al., 2010; Rutter et al., 
2011). Children can respond with anxiety to separation, animals, thunder, social situations, 
dentists, and dreams, among others, and many adolescents experience spells of depressed mood, 
as these are common and transient distress experiences in response to the major biological, 
psychological and social transitions that are outlined throughout this book (cf. Rutter et al., 
2011; Revonsuo, 2000). At the end of adolescence, about 25% of the population experienced 
an anxiety or depression disorder, which is defined by significant suffering and functional 
impairment (APA, 2013; Beesdo et al., 2009; Merikangas et al., 2010; Rutter et al., 2011). Many 
children and early adolescents suffer in silence because their mood disorders go unnoticed 
(Zahn-Waxler et al., 2000), and many more suffer from high anxiety and depression symptom 
levels. Childhood disorder episodes are often indicative of lifespan developments, as 75% recur 
during adolescence, up to an average of nine separate episodes over their lifespan (Burcusa & 
Iacono, 2007; Rutter et al., 2011). Some studies suggests that the majority of the youth who 
have ever been clinically depressed will be in an episode in any given year over the remainder 
of their lives (Kessler & Wang, 2009), although others paint a less gloomy future (Bos et al., 
2018; Rottenberg et al., 2018). Nonetheless, most adolescents with a depression also report 
current or past anxiety disorders, while about a third of the adolescents with anxiety disorders 
also experience depression (Brady, 1992; Davis et al., 2015).  
A central goal of psychiatric research is to better understand anxiety and depression 
states (Kendler et al., 2011). This chapter illustrates the use of dynamic system perspectives to 
understand anxiety and depression as experiences that emerge from a system of constituent 
affective, emotion, and mood components that synchronize across scales of resolution and 
function and evolve as one integrated process within each of us. In doing so this chapter 
illustrates how dynamic system perspectives can provide new insights into anxiety and 




Anxiety and depression can be defined as emotions that span minutes to days, as mood episodes 
that can persist over weeks to months, and as part of our personalities, which change along the 
lifespan, and describe how people navigate the world, define who they are, and talk about 
themselves. Dynamic system perspectives can increase our understanding of anxiety and 
depression as multi-component and dynamic processes that continuously change over time and 
are inherently connected via their self-organizing and dynamic nature and circular causality. 
Moods and personality traits are thought to emerge from interactions between highly variable 
“microscopic” emotion components (as outlined below), after which these more integrated 
macroscopic system levels start to structure and constrain our moment-to-moment component 
experiences top-down (see Table 7.1), resulting in circular causality and increasingly complex 
and stable affect systems (e.g., Fajkowska, 2015; Granic, 2005; Kendler et al., 2011; Van der 
Stel, 2009; Van Geert & Steenbeek, 2005; Wichers et al., 2018; Witherington, 2007).  
The functional unity of this multiscale system is often illustrated with the metaphor of 
emotions as the weather of our lives (e.g., sadness as rain clouds, a cold breeze of fear, and 
sunshine as joy), and mood and personality as our internal climates (e.g., Liljenström & Svedin, 
2005; Ochsner et al., 2012; Russell, 2017). It may be difficult to forecast daily weather and 
emotions over more than ten days, as these trajectories are inherently chaotic (i.e., irregular and 
extremely sensitive to small baseline deviations), but more climatic or “average weather” such 
as seasons are rather stable, predictable, orderly, and relatively enduring (e.g., Boeing, 2016; 
Liljenström et al., 2005). The personality traits Anxiety and Depression can be seen as macro-
level attractor basins that calibrate our internal dynamics resulting in less environmental input 
necessary to move toward specific micro real-time emotional states of anxiety and depression 
(Jeronimus, 2015; Revelle & Condon, 2017; Van der Stel, 2009). Below we zoom into each of 
these component levels and processes in detail.  
Affect and emotions: the micro level 
Affect is a continuous hedonic “commentary” on our current state of affairs that naturally 
infuses our perception as if it were a “sixth sense” that is integrated with other sensory 
processing and is typically experienced as a property of people or objects in the world (Barrett, 
2017, 2018; Panksepp & Biven, 2012) to guide judgment and decision making (Kahneman & 
Egan, 2011; Schwarz, 2010; Slovic et al., 2007). Affects are internal subjective states that are 
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only known to those who have them. Anxiety and depression as emotions refer to discrete 
snapshots of this continuous stream of affective experience, when a specific context becomes 
imbued with meaning to instigate a specific action.  
Emotions can be defined as (a) intense and transient subjective states that last for 
seconds up to 72 hours at most (Panksepp & Biven, 2012; Sonnemans & Frijda, 1994; Verduyn 
et al., 2011); which (b) “emerge” in response to specific events or stimuli (extrinsic or intrinsic 
to the organism); and (c) can be categorized according to their affective valence (from 
unpleasant to pleasant) and emotional arousal or bodily activation (Anderson & Adolphs, 2014; 
Yik et al., 2011; Kuppens et al., 2010; Panksepp & Biven, 2012). Anxiety and depression are 
both unpleasant affects, and low positive affect is relatively specific for depression and social 
anxiety, with anxiety being marked by high physiological arousal and depression by low arousal 
(Russell, 2003; Watson et al., 2005).  Emotions are detectable on the outside in facial 
expression, skin color, vocal timbre, gestures, and odor, among others (Ekman, 2008; De Waal, 
2019; Panksepp et al., 2012). 
The classical emotion perspective postulated that children are born with abilities to 
distinguish the primary emotions (e.g., anxiety/fear, depression/sadness, happiness, anger, and 
disgust) that cover most of our transactions with the world (Darwin, 1872; Russell, 1990). 
Anxiety and depression were understood as hardwired prototypical adaptive scripts that become 
activated by a particular class of stimuli (e.g., a threat, obstacle, or loss) to orchestrate 
psychological changes in feelings and thoughts and activate coordinated thought-action 
repertoires and goal-oriented behavior, which we evolved to respond quickly and adequately to 
changes in the environment that might affect our well-being (Damasio et al., 2000; Ortony & 
Turner, 1990; Panksepp et al., 2012; Plutchik, 2001; Roseman et al., 1994; Russell, 2017).  
The prototypical script for anxiety becomes activated when a threat (stimulus) signals 
the detection of an ongoing source of danger (cognition) and evokes anxiety or fear (affect) as 
an impulse to prepare, flee, hide, counterattack, or scream (action) to protect ourselves and 
reach safety (goal), which may well save our lives. Similarly, instances of depression start with 
the loss of a valued object or support (stimulus) which indicates abandonment (cognition) and 
evokes sadness (affect) and an impulse to cry (action) in order to reattach with this lost object 
(goal), or to save energy and tread carefully until conditions improve, and our needs are met. 
More complex emotions such as shame or guilt were thought to originate as mixtures of these 
five basic emotions (Plutchik, 2001; Russell, 1990; 2017; Shaver et al., 1987).  
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Table 7.1. Hierarchical temporal organization of levels for analysis of distress experiences 
 Level of organization Time scale Concept Construct Severity 
 Nano Moment-to-moment Seconds Feeling - thoughts Affect - cognitions + 
1. Micro Fluctuations Minutes Emotions Anxiety, Sadness, Fear, Anger + 
  Daily - diurnal Hours Symptoms Examples provided in Table 7.3 ++ 
2. Meso States Weeks Moods Anxiety - depression ++ 
  Episodic Months Disorder states MDD - GAD ++++ 
3. Macro Dispositions Years Temperament Negative affectivity ++ 
  Lifespan Decades Personality Trait anxiety - trait depression + 
 Mega Generations Centuries Culture Cultural scrips and norms of reaction 
  Lineage Millennia Evolution Forces that maintain heritable variation  
Note: MDD = major depressive disorder; GAD = Generalized Anxiety Disorder. The micro and meso level are often covered in cross-sectional 
perspectives (e.g., a point prevalence or frequency at a specific point in time) whereas the macrolevel covers lifespan perspectives and lifetime 








A more dynamically oriented constructivist perspective postulates that anxiety and 
depression have no single physical form and must be understood as spectra (like colours) or 
categories of instances (families of functionally related states) that differ in many degrees, 
qualities, and intensities (see Table 7.2), but share their template – like chairs or cookies – and 
thus cluster near one another in property space (Barrett, 2017, 2018; Kendler et al., 2011; Posner 
et al., 2005; Russell, 2003; Salzman & Fusi, 2010). Instances of anxiety and depression differ 
between people and within people at different instances and along the lifespan, because each 
episode is constructed from learned assemblies of bits and pieces of previous experience (i.e., 
statistical regularities) which form prototypical scripts or cognitive tools to communicate about 
feelings and to anticipate future events and to deal with them (Barrett, 2017, 2018; Russel, 1990, 
2001). Recent emotion theories group the thousands semantic emotion terms we use over up to 
27 emotion families including anxiety (nervous), fear (afraid, horror), horror (shock, scared), 
and depression (sadness), see Table 7.2 (e.g., Cowen et al., 2017; Verduyn et al., 2015). 
Today most theorists argue that the emotions anxiety and depression emerge from the 
synchronization of various interoceptive, perceptual, cognitive, and motor components that 
mutually amplify one another until they converge at a dominant emotion state that best fits the 
specific situational instance in which one finds oneself, and from which a subjective 
understanding of the situation emerges to potentiate a particular remedy to deal with it 
(Adolphs, 2003; Anderson & Adolphs, 2014; Barrett, 2018; Damasio et al., 2000; Lewis, 2000; 
Scherer, 2009; Tooby & Cosmides, 2008). Subsequently, these anxiety and depression states 
influence the way people screen, categorize, and interpret information, decide what is important 
and valuable, and stimulate rumination, which are all feedback loops that direct the dynamic 
system towards a stable emotion configuration or attractor (see Chapter 1). Such feedback loops 
enable the emotion state to unfold over time periods far beyond the presence of the stimuli that 
caused the emotion and the component processes themselves (called “hysteresis”), a non-
linearity that is typical for complex systems (e.g., Hollenstein, 2015; Verduyn et al., 2015; Van 
der Maas & Molenaar, 1992).  
This complex emotion system is favored by natural selection because it can reconfigure 
itself into a multitude of different states while dissimilar representations can give rise to emotion 
instances of the same category (such as anxiety or depression) in different contexts (Barrett, 
2017; Kuppens et al., 2010). Anxiety and depression are thus understood as self-organizing 
dynamic processes that combine affect, motivation, evaluation, attention, learning, memory, 
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wanting, and so on, to construct emotional experiences that give meaning to context. Because 
every instance of anxiety or depression is constructed, variability is the norm, which enables 
individuals to respond flexibly, and to establish unique individual-environment relationships ( 
Hollenstein, 2015; Scherer, 2009; Tooby & Cosmides, 2008; Kuppens et al., 2009).  
Emotions are multifaceted phenomena that can differ markedly across individuals and 
cultures, which illustrates their developmental malleability, and each individual should 
therefore be pictured as a dynamic system with an unique architecture and resulting dynamics 
over time (Barrett, 2018; Fisher et al., 2018; Fogel et al., 1992; Thompson, 1994). 
Consequently, two people can experience an identical situation quite differently, and converge 
to different emotion states (e.g., sad versus anxious) as a consequence of their personal history 
and situational understanding, including whether the event was unexpected, controllable, can 
be coped with, was one’s own fault, and so on (Barrett, 2017, 2018; Jeronimus et al., 2017; 
Stanton, 2012). Individual differences in emotional clarity or the extent into which one can 
identify, label, and characterize emotions, can explain why some adolescents recognize and 
experience anxiety and depression as strongly differentiated and discrete emotion states, while 
others experience either both together or none (Bailen et al., 2019; Erbas et al., 2014; Fisher et 
al., 2018; Gohm & Clore, 2000; Mathews et al., 2016).  
Adolescents learn to construct and differentiate increasingly fine-tuned feelings as 
specific emotion categories to summarize experiences more efficiently and precisely, thus 
increasing emotional granularity or “emotional intelligence” (see Table 7.2; Barrett, 2018; 
Erbas et al., 2014; Nook et al., 2018; Russell, 1990). Adolescents with heightened interoception 
and low emotional clarity (i.e., difficulties in attributing these inner sensations to specific 
emotions) or low granularity (i.e., little emotion differentiation) more often feel unhappy, report 
social problems, and develop anxiety and depression disorders (Barrett, 2018; Demiralp et al., 
2012; Erbas et al., 2014; Kashdan & Farmer, 2014; Mathews et al., 2016; Palser et al., 2018; 
Sendzik et al., 2017). Being able to put a feeling into words (such as sad or afraid) can already 
decrease the subjective intensity of the experience (Lieberman et al., 2011). 
An improved understanding of how adolescents construct anxiety and depression and 
accept these experiences can result in strategies to intervene in this construction process, to 
buffer adolescents against all kinds of social and mental adversity, as emotions can be 
deconstructed into their experiential components to be re-categorized, which is thought to 
influence how adolescents perceive their reality (Barrett, 2018; Brackett et al., 2012; Kashdan 
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et al., 2015; Sendzik et al., 2017). Now that we have defined anxiety and depression as 
prototypical emotion categories (i.e., populations of diverse instances) that emerge in response 
to specific contexts to give the ebb and flow of life meaning, we zoom into their dynamics.  
 
Table 7.2. Anxiety and depression as emotions and personality traits  
 Category  Instances / definitions 
Emotions Anxiety Nervous Tense, apprehension, worry, distress, dread, unease, 
distressed, frustrated, nervousness, etc. 
 Fear Afraid Alarm, fright, terror, panic, hysteria, horror, shock, 
mortification, scared, etc. 
  Horror Shock, scared 
 Depression Sadness Gloomy, sorrow, grief, despair, hopeless, misery,  
melancholy, bored, droopy, tired, sleepy 
   Disappointment, displeasure, dismay 
   Guilt, shame, embarrassment, regret, remorse 
   Neglect, loneliness, isolation, defeat, rejection, 
humiliation, insecurity, homesickness, etc. 
Personality Neuroticism Tendency to perceive the world as threatening, to be prone to 
experience unpleasant and disturbing emotions in reaction to 
various types of stress (emotional instability), and to select 
oneself into situations that foster negative affect. 
  Anxiety Characteristic level of free floating anxiety and fear proneness 
  Depression Tendency to experience feelings of sadness, guilt, loneliness, 
and hopelessness 
Note: William James (1890) already emphasized the tremendous variability in the human emotions that people 
refer to with the same emotion word. Source: The depicted emotion instances were derived from Barrett (2018), 
Cowen et al. (2017), Russell (1980), and Shaver et al. (1987). The description of neuroticism was derived from 




One of the most challenging topics in the study of anxiety and depression is to understand the 
processes underlying the temporal dynamics of emotion (Hollenstein, 2015; Houben et al., 
2015; Kuppens et al., 2010; Lewis, 2005; Reitsema et al., 2019). The duration of emotions can 
help to distinguish closely related experiences such as shame versus guilt or fear versus anxiety 
(Panksepp & Biven, 2012). For example, when studying 27 emotions, in most people sadness 
lasted the longest (median 48 hours), while anxiety and guilt (median 4 hours) and fear (median 
1 hour) and shame (median 30 minutes) were among the shortest emotion episodes (Verduyn 
et al., 2015). The most studied emotion dynamics in adolescents include the frequency with 
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which they experience anxiety or depression over a protracted period of time, the average 
magnitude of emotion over time (intensity), the range of fluctuations (variability), the 
magnitude of these fluctuations from moment to moment (instability), the temporal dependency 
of emotion states (inertia), whether anxiety or depression increase (augment) or decrease (blunt) 
one another over time, and adolescents’ differentiation (granularity) and clarity of emotions 
(see Bailen et al., 2019 and Reitsema et al., 2019 for reviews). 
Adolescents show substantial individual differences in the dynamics of anxiety and depression, 
but the average frequencies and intensities peak in late adolescence, especially in girls, followed 
by a decrease over adulthood (Bailen et al., 2019; Carstensen et al., 2000; Reitsema et al., 2019; 
see for adults Fisher et al., 2017, 2018; Houben et al., 2015). Adolescents who report more 
frequent, intense, persistent, and variable negative emotions (especially sadness, nervousness 
and anger) and decreased positive emotions and energy are most vulnerable for the development 
of episodes of anxious or depressed mood (Bailen et al., 2019; Kuppens et al., 2012; Neumann 
et al., 2011; Silk et al., 2003; Morgan et al., 2017). 
Today there is a scarcity of studies of real-time (moment-to-moment) dynamics of affect 
and emotion components and regulation processes in single individuals across and within time 
under natural conditions in daily life (Hollenstein, 2015; Houben et al., 2015; Wichers et al., 
2015, 2018), or how these emotional experiences change over adolescence (see for reviews: 
Bailen et al., 2019; Reitsema et al., 2019). Momentary assessment studies (EMA) of emotions 
typically apply non-adjacent sampling intervals and 3 to 10 assessments per day for 7 to 30 days 
(Houben et al., 2015; Kuppens & Verduyn, 2017; Reitsema et al., 2019; Trull et al., 2015; Van 
der Krieke et al., 2015); although some studies assessed daily anxiety symptoms over 236 days 
(Hoenders et al., 2012) or daily depression symptoms over 239 days (Wichers et al., 2016), and 
there are studies in which a group completed 500 measures per participant over 4 months 
(Wichers et al., 2018). Researchers suggest that minimal 25 to 30 assessments per subject may 
be recommended for multilevel models (Bolger et al., 2012; Maas & Hox, 2005; which still mix 
within- and between-person effects), whereas for subject-specific dynamic models of 
interacting variables by means of vector autoregressive (VAR) modeling at least 44-50 
assessments are required (Box et al., 2015; Fisher et al, 2018; Van der Krieke et al., 2016) up 
to 100 assessments to model changes in the conventional dynamic processes themselves 
(Bringmann et al., 2017; Wichers et al., 2018) and switches in state-space models (Hamaker & 
Grasman, 2012).  
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Promising future avenues to improve our understanding of states of anxiety and 
depression are challenging studies that (a) examine various dynamic processes in single 
adolescents and changes therein over adolescence (Bailen et al., 2019; Reitsema et al., 2019; 
Koval et al., 2013; Krone et al., 2018) and (b) capture the stream of affective experience in real 
time to follow their emergence and unfolding via the synchronization of various emotion 
components (time-shifting contemporaneous relations), which requires high-frequency 
sampling. Furthermore, dynamic system perspectives can also help to zoom into instances in 
which emotions fail to function properly, such as disruptions in affective valence or emotional 
intensity, and problems with emotional clarity and differentiation (APA, 2013; Sendzik et al., 
2017). Examples of emotion intensity disturbances include being over- or under-reactive to 
emotional situations, such as extremely low levels of positive affect in depressed adolescents, 
or a swing towards extreme high positive affect intensities during manic-depressive episodes 
(Birmaher, 2013; Rutter et al., 2011). Finally, future studies may use multimethod assessments 
to capture adolescent experience, and compare and combine different indices for emotion 
dynamics (Bos et al., 2018; Houben et al., 2015; Koval et al., 2013; Reitsema et al., 2019).  
The emotion literature suggests that (a) anxiety and depression are constructions of the 
world rather than reactions to it, (b) that changes in emotion dynamics can be indicative for the 
development of a mood disorder, and (c) may serve as an early warning signal, and these ideas 
shall be explored in more depth below. 
Mood episodes (meso level) 
Anxious and depressed mood spells describe sustained negative background affects that color 
as generalized emotions but are much lower in arousal and wider in scope. Whereas emotions 
are highly contextualized, moods evaluate the world as a whole, and often lack a specific start 
and stop (Barrett, 2018; Beedie et al., 2005; Horwitz & Wakefield, 2007). Moods can be defined 
as internal subjective states perpetuated by extended cognitive configurations that narrow 
attention towards ongoing internal processes (see Table 7.3) and a restricted set of interactions 
and understandings of the surrounding world (APA, 2013; Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; Isen, 
1990). In short, depressed adolescents are characterized by negative views of themselves, the 
world, and their future, and uncontrollable self-critical cognitions, which impede their ability 
to generate positive affect (Gotlib & Joorman, 2010; Rutter et al., 2011). Mood states typically 
last for weeks to months and have a relatively constant quality even though the state itself is 
dynamic, and this progression from normal affect fluctuations to entrenchment is what 
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characterizes mood as a developmental process (De Zwart et al., 2018; Lewis, 2000; Rutter et 
al., 2011). 
Mood episodes are characterized by the emergence of a metacognitive or recursive 
consciousness (a higher-order structure) as individuals can become aware of their internal state 
as a mode of perception that underlies cognitive decoupling or “head-and-heart splits” (Damasio 
et al., 2000; Schooler et al., 2011). People disengage their attention from perception (perceptual 
decoupling), notice the current contents of consciousness (meta-awareness), and realize that 
their feelings do not match their cognitive evaluation of the situation, thus that something goes 
awry. Key examples are anhedonia and guilt (see Table 7.3). Anhedonia refers to being unable 
to feel pleasure in situations or after events that one recognizes as normally pleasurable 
activities which is typical for childhood depression (see APA, 2013; Russell, 2017). Depressed 
adolescents often report guilt, a self-conscious emotion characterized by tension, regret, and 
remorse about a particular (in)action that comprises one’s moral or personal standards (not 
living up to ideal self) while one could have done otherwise (APA, 2013; Roseman et al., 1994; 
Rutter et al., 2011). Such higher-order structures illustrate the complexity of mood states, which 
emerge from various nonlinear dynamic interactions between affective and cognitive elements. 
Anxious and depressed syndromes refer to flexible and dynamic systems of constitutive 
heterogeneous elements (co-occurring feelings, thoughts, and actions, see Table 7.3 and APA, 
2013), thus moods are formative dimensional constructs similar to the constructivist perspective 
on emotions (e.g., Borsboom, 2008, 2017; Constantini et al., 2019; Fried & Nesse, 2015; Gotlib 
& Joorman, 2010; Heeren et al., 2018; Kendler et al., 2011, 2012; Wichers et al., 2018). There 
may not even be a classification for anxiety or depression etched in the structure of the world 
and both may be merely concepts (Kendler et al., 2011, 2015). The idea of anxiety and 
depression as populations of instances and dynamic perspectives on their development can 
explain how different causes may eventually yield similar symptom clusters while similar 
causes do not necessarily result in similar outcomes. In a constantly changing world such stable 
(or inert) anxious or depressed mood states must be maintained with feedback loops that affect 
the emotional state space by steeping the slopes towards these attractors that previously were 
passed easily, including cognitive emotion regulation strategies and behaviors (Aldao et al., 




The synchronization of mood elements is often studied using networks of symptoms (or 
“nodes”) and their interactions (or “connections,” see Borsboom 2017; Fried et al., 2017; 
Marsman et al., 2018; McNally, 2016; Wichers, 2013). The interactions in these systems are 
described with node centrality indexes, especially connection strength, closeness, and 
betweenness (Bringmann et al., 2018; McNally, 2016; Opsahl ea, 2010). Strength indicates the 
direct influence of each symptom or node on the network (via partial correlations), and can be  
subdivided over instrength (activated by many other symptoms) and outstrength (activates 
many other symptoms), and node interconnectedness can also be expressed in terms of shared 
variance with their neighbors (Haslbeck & Fried, 2017). Closeness indicates the shortest 
distance between each node to identify direct and indirect influences. Betweenness indicates 
the number of times a node traverses the shortest path between two other nodes. Nodes with 
high betweenness are “gate keepers” that connect less central nodes or “bridge” different 
substructures within the psychological network (see Table 7.3), and because reciprocal 
symptom connections within and between anxiety and depression are often equivalent (Cramer 
et al., 2010; Fisher et al., 2017), these experiences co-occur. 
Recovery time is a network metric that quantifies emotion regulation efficiency 
(Thompson, 1994; Yang et al., 2018), and the networks of people with higher overall depression 
require longer recovery time after socioemotional processes (Yang et al., 2018), also after 
adjustment for recent life events. High or increasing connectivity between symptoms of affect 
and cognition may indicate emotional inflexibility or “inertia,” which is typically understood 
as a more fragile system state in which sudden transitions towards other symptom states 
becomes more likely (Scheffer et al., 2012; Wichers et al., 2018). Adolescents often report 
sudden changes in symptom levels of anxiety and depression (Rutter et al., 2011), and such 
transitions are a hallmark of complex systems in which tension may rise gradually (as resilience 
levels may diminish slowly or even without notice) after which minor contextual disturbances 
can push the system over a “tipping point” towards another basin of attraction (Callahan et al., 
1990; Scheffer et al., 2012; Van der Maas et al., 1992; Wichers et al., 2018).  
The concept of an attractor basin can reconcile the common experience of mood states 
as emerging out of the blue (Hayes et al., 2007) with studies that indicate developmental 
trajectories for mood symptoms (although discontinuous and non-stationary; Myin-Germeys et 
al., 2009; Wichers et al., 2018). This dynamic bimodality of normal versus disorder system 
states is intuitive to many scholars and clinicians and has derived some empirical support  
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Table 7.3. Definitions of distress states according to the Diagnostic and Statistical manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) 
 MDD Dysthymia GAD PTSD # Criteria for MDD 
Symptom       
Dysphoria X    1 Depressed mood, i.e. feeling sad, empty, or hopeless 
Anhedonia X    2 Diminished interest or pleasure in virtually all activities  
Appetite 
disturbance 
    3 Weight loss or gain or decreased/increased appetite 
Sleep disturbance     4 Insomnia or hypersomnia 
Restlessness     5 Psychomotor agitation or retardation (lethargy) 
Fatigue     6 Loss of energy 
Worthlessness     7 Feelings of worthlessness or excessive or inappropriate guilt 
Concentration     8 Problems with thinking/concentration or indecisiveness 
Irritability      Irritable mood most of the time (childhood specific) 
Suicidal ideation     9 Preoccupation with death, suicidal ideation (plans) or attempt 
Worry   X    
Withdrawal       Social withdrawal 
Anxiety   X   Apprehensive expectation 
Muscle tension       
Guilt       
Shame       
Note: X = core symptoms; MDD = major depressive disorder; GAD = generalized anxiety disorder; PTSD = post-traumatic stress disorder.  
Four major distress disorders can be identified in the DSM-5 (APA, 2013) on the basis of multiple experiences of which many are shared as 
indicated in gray (example derived from Lahey et al., 2017, table 1; but also see Kotov et al., 2017; Zahn-Waxler et al., 2000). Children can show 
several anxiety disorders, including separation anxiety, panic disorder, agoraphobia, specific phobia, social phobia, obsessive-compulsive 





(e.g., Cramer et al., 2016; Hosenfeld et al., 2015; Van de Leemput et al., 2013). One double-
blind study using intensive self-monitoring of one man over 239 days (1,474 observations) 
confirms the presence of a sudden shift in the severity of depressive symptoms (Wichers et al., 
2016) and a study over 236 days showed a sharp increase in anxiety symptoms (Hoenders et 
al., 2012), but such longitudinal evidence remains both scarce and essential (Bos & De Jonge, 
2014). The possibility of discrete shifts between normal versus anxious or depressed states is 
supported by brain stimulation studies (Panksepp & Biven, 2012) and rapid shifts from states 
of anxiety with marked dysphoria to normal after the anxiety-eliciting situation (such as a 
separation, animal, object, social situation or thunder) is eliminated (Rutter et al., 2011).  
Mood symptoms typically develop, activate, and synchronize over time until the system 
state becomes self-sustaining and unusually intense or persistent (Myin-Germeys et al., 2009; 
Wichers et al., 2018). For example, insomnia may drive fatigue and concentration problems, 
while anhedonia may lead to guilt, which may lead to low self-worth, and so on (Borsboom et 
al., 2017; Kendler et al., 2011; Wichers et al., 2013). Moods themselves are defined in terms of 
symptoms that persist for weeks (APA, 2013, macro level) while the underlying processes 
probably reflect everyday hour-to-hour fluctuations (micro level). In a study of 104 depressed 
patients by Bos et al. (2017; assessed ten times a day for five days) sadness was most sensitive 
to the other symptoms (highest instrength), whereas anhedonia had the most influence on other 
symptoms (outstrength). Daily level changes in positive mood, hopelessness, anger, and 
irritability most often activated other symptoms in anxious and depressed patients (Fisher et al., 
2017), and thus not depressed mood, anhedonia, and worry, the putative cardinal symptoms 
(see Table 7.3). When studied on a weekly resolution, however, all symptoms of depression 
showed connections over time (either direct or indirectly), with anhedonia as the most central 
item (Bringmann et al., 2015).  
These examples illustrate that dynamic relationships differ across timescales (Dormann 
& Griffin, 2015; Hamaker & Wichers, 2017; Schiepek et al., 2016), therefore real-time changes 
in affect and rapidly cycling emotions (which require high-frequency assessments) must be 
connected with changes in mood symptoms and negative cognitions (about the self and future), 
which mandate comparatively low-frequency measurements over weeks and months. 
Therapeutic processes, for example, cover both micro processes such as interactions within each 
session and more long-term sequential regularities that occur between consecutive sessions (see 
Chapter 4; Molenaar, 2010). Studies increasingly combine measurements across multiple 
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“bursts” of intensive experience sampling over one year (Yang et al., 2018) which may help 
improve our understanding of mood in adolescence (Maciejewski et al., 2015).  
A major application of dynamic system perspectives in contemporary mood research is 
the quest for generic early warning signals that may indicate upcoming transitions into a mood 
disorder episode, as such signals would enable for preventive strategies. Most attention goes to 
critical slowing down, enhanced symptom variability, and increasing autocorrelation as signals 
for transitions between such qualitatively different system states (Nelson et al., 2017; Wichers 
et al., 2015, 2016, 2018), but also frequency distributions, varying complexity, or other dynamic 
features are used (Molenaar, 2010; Schiepek et al., 2016). At the group-level there is some 
evidence for increases in autocorrelation (Van de Leemput et al., 2013) and higher system 
entropy before people experience a transition into a depressive state (Lanata et al., 2015). One 
individual-level study provided evidence for rising autocorrelations and variance before the 
onset of a depressed episode (Wichers et al., 2016). Studies of therapeutic contexts showed that 
increasing emotional fluctuations can indicate qualitative change (Lichtwarck-Aschoff et al., 
2012; Schiepek, 2016). 
Definite proof of generic early warning signals for the onset of anxiety or depression 
episodes requires researchers to monitor many individuals with high-frequency assessments 
over a long period in advance of the transition under study – and because such data has been 
collected with compliance rates of 80% and up (see Hoenders et al., 2012; Wichers et al., 2016, 
2018; Schiepek et al., 2016), in the near future we expect studies that show whether the idea of 
warning signals has substance, and result in the implementation of prevention strategies. At the 
group-level the timing of such discrete transitions in depressive symptom severity is 
inconsistent (De Zwart et al., 2018) which indicates substantial individual variability and 
sudden changes; This is illustrated in Figure 7.1, which shows the recovery trajectory of 267 
participants over 140 weeks in terms of their depressive symptoms (a 50% symptom reduction 
after 30 weeks) and demonstrates how uninformative group-level indicators can be for 
individual patterns. The idea of non-linear shifts in symptom severity combined with large 
individual variability favors knowledge on how symptoms evolve at the level of the individual 
in daily life to elucidate mechanisms, because the underlying causes are probably individual-
specific (Fisher et al., 2018; Wichers et al., 2013; Yang et al., 2018). People with a psychosis 
or bipolar disorder often identify their individualized early warning signals for an upcoming 
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episode, which illustrates how dynamic system applications can lay hidden in routine care 
practices (see Chapter 4).  
Figure 7.1. A group-level trajectory of depressive symptoms over 140 weeks (above) and 
the associated person-level trajectories (below) in 267 participants.  
 
 
Note. The trajectory of depressive symptoms over 140 weeks as assessed with the composite international 
diagnostic interview (CIDI) based on the DSM-IV criteria, to study remission rates (≤5 symptoms) and group-
level changes over time. Source: Conradi et al. (2007). This figure was generously provided by Peter de Jonge 
and Elske Bos. 
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Paradoxically, dynamic system perspectives also predict inherent limitations to the 
application of warning signals. Mood symptoms are connected via many feedback and 
multiplicative processes within individuals, which makes our development nonlinear and 
dynamic, as it depends on our current system state. As previously outlined with the weather 
metaphor, individual dynamics, emergent processes, thresholds of instability, and sudden 
transitions limit the predictability of developmental processes, and some futures shall therefore 
remain unknowable with precision, if only because tiny changes can compound to substantial 
outcome differences (“the butterfly effect,” see Chapter 4; Boeing, 2016; Granic, 2005). Finally, 
the question remains as to whether mood disorder symptoms (Table 7.3) are defined at the right 
level of granularity to successfully identify the components of the system (as there may be 
hundreds of variables) while state transitions (if they exist) are likely to be governed by only a 
few (Borsboom, 2017; Van der Maas et al., 1992).  
Promising future avenues to study anxious and depressed moods include the integration 
of complex dynamic processes across levels of resolution via simultaneous top-down and 
bottom-up approaches (Forbes et al., 2016; Witherington, 2007) and models that integrate 
within and between person estimates (Adolf et al., 2014; Ernst et al., 2019; Fisher et al., 2018). 
Researchers increasingly estimate person-specific complex dynamic systems, which they 
subsequently aggregate into group-level clusters with more comparable dynamics and response 
synchronization processes (Beltz et al., 2016; Ernst et al., 2018; Yang et al., 2018), to inform 
etiological theories. Studies of mood dynamics often use regression-based methods to unravel 
autoregressive effects (how symptoms affect themselves) and cross-regressive effects (how 
symptoms affect each other) over time via VAR models using all lag-1 relations, which can 
handle unique direct effects, but not shared changes (i.e., shared variance is removed) or stable 
predictors (see Bulteel et al., 2016 and Molenaar, 2018, for a discussion of limitations, and 
Bringmann et al., 2013, for multilevel models, e.g. person-mean centering requires the 
assumption of stationarity). Researchers also questioned the validity of using centrality indices 
to study mood symptom networks (Bringmann et al., 2018; Forbes et al., 2017; Hallquist et al., 
2019), including betweenness and closeness centrality as measures of node importance 
(Bringmann et al., 2018), and struggled with statistical equivalent network and latent variable 
models despite their marked conceptual differences (Markman et al., 2018; Molenaar et al., 
2007, 2010), which suggests that other and more advanced methodologies are required. Future 
studies might apply more advanced dynamic system techniques (examples in this book and ), 
dynamic cluster models (Ernst et al., 2019), and more diverse and multimethod measures (e.g, 
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observers, language analyses, interviews), as the almost exclusive usage of self-report measures 
of adolescents’ anxiety and depression goes along with some threats to validity (Eisenberg et 
al., 2010), and should be interpreted with caution.  
Personality (macro level) 
Humans are highly variable and complex, but also show shared patterns in feelings, thoughts, 
and behaviors that persist over time and across situations. Personality captures the “dynamic 
organization within the individual of those psychophysical traits that determine his unique 
adjustments to his environment” (Allport, 1937). A large part of what makes each of us unique 
is our emotional life and idiographic history (Kuppens et al., 2009; McAdams, 2015). Most 
individual differences in these patterned characteristics can be summarized in terms of Five 
Factors or broad “trait families” (John et al., 2008), namely, Neuroticism, Extraversion, 
Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, and Openness to new experiences (the “Big 
Five”).Nowadays many theorists assume that personality “emerges out of the connectivity 
structure that exists between the various components of personality” (Cramer et al., 2012, p.414, 
also see Baumert et al., 2017; Constantini et al., 2019; Mõttus & Allerhand, 2017; Ormel et al., 
2017), a perspective similar to the constructivist perspectives on emotion and mood, but with 
different content and over longer time scales (see Table 7.1)1. Without such pattern recognition, 
our observations remain unfocused and random (De Waal, 2019). 
The neuroticism factor taps into the organization and functioning of negative emotion 
systems (APA, 2013, p.679; Ormel et al., 2013; Shackman et al., 2016), and refers to a dynamic 
macro-level structure of synchronized preferences, goals, values, concepts, motives, and 
narratives, which evolves in each of us while we develop along the lifespan (e.g., Back et al., 
2011; Cramer et al., 2012; DeYoung, 2015; Fajkowska, 2015; Fleeson et al., 2015; 
Jayawickreme et al., 2019; Jeronimus, 2015; Lewis, 2000; McAdams, 2015; Mischel & Shoda, 
1995; Mõttus et al., 2018; Ormel et al., 2017; Tackett et al, 2012; Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). 
Prominent members of the neuroticism family are the facet traits Anxiety and Depression (see 
Table 7.2 for definitions) and Vulnerability (or general susceptibility to stress), which capture 
the frequency and intensity with which adolescents experience the emotions anxiety and 
depression over time and in different situations (Costa & McCrae, 2006), as well as current 
                                                          
1 The various dynamic accounts of personality include Whole Trait Theory (Jayawickreme et al., 2019), CB5 
theory (DeYoung, 2015), Mixed Model of Personality (Ormel et al., 2017), TESSERA (Wrzus & Roberts, 2017), 
among others.  
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mood symptom levels (Kotov et al., 2010; Riese et al., 2015). The neuroticism trait family is a 
vulnerability for the later development of full-blown anxiety and depression disorders 
(Jeronimus et al., 2016). A key difference between mood episodes and the facet traits of Anxiety 
and Depression is that the former are deemed to indicate intra-individual deviations from our 
particular personal normality, whereas the latter refers to more permanent individual differences 
in personality dispositions (Jeronimus et al., 2013, 2016; Riese et al., 2015).  
Neuroticism can be understood as an umbrella term or macro-level “attractor basin” for 
negative affect - the rather stable climatic “average weather” over adolescence - but this 
personality landscape changes over the lifespan, which can help explain why adolescence is 
marked by high intensity and variable emotion states of anxiety and depression. Most 
adolescents experience temporary decreases in conscientiousness (self-regulation) and 
agreeableness (warmth, friendliness and tact) and increase in neuroticism 
(Anxiety/Depression), a pattern that reverses from early adulthood onwards (see Roberts & 
Wood, 2006 for a meta-analysis and Soto et al., 2011 for a cross-sectional study of 1 million 
participants). High neuroticism (or negative emotional reactivity and distress), and low 
conscientiousness (or poor effortful control and emotion regulation) and low extraversion (or 
low positive emotionality) underlie individual differences in sensitivity to reward and 
punishment and predict levels of anxiety and depression over adolescence (Watson et al., 2005; 
Rutter et al., 2011).  
Emotion regulation refers to adolescents’ abilities to regulate emotion dynamics back to 
their “normal” system state and the regulatory processes that are installed to keep their core 
affect in check (“attractor strength”; see Thompson, 1994; Kuppens et al., 2010), and 
dysfunctional patterns play a crucial role in the development and persistence of depression and 
anxiety (Jeronimus et al., 2016; Sendzik et al., 2017; Snyder et al., 2015). Most therapies 
therefore aim to re-establish cognitive control over emotions, via exposure, re-interpretation (of 
the way a situation is construed), or suppression (Gross, 2002), and clinicians increasingly focus 
on neuroticism as a target for therapy (Barlow et al., 2014; Roberts et al., 2017).  
High neuroticism is associated with the “neurotic cascade” (Suls et al., 2005) which 
describes a set of processes that can help explain the recurrence of states of anxiety and 
depression: (a) heightened reactivity, exposure, and negative appraisals to signs of threat and 
negative emotion in the social world (Ormel et al., 2013; Shackman et al., 2016); (b) being 
exposed to more negative events (Jeronimus et al., 2013, 2014); (c) the tendency to appraise 
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objectively neutral or positive events in negative terms (Laceulle et al., 2015; Shackman et al., 
2016); (d) mood spill-over, whereby negative feelings in one area of life spill over into others 
(Jeronimus, 2015); and (e) excessive rumination, worries, and intolerance of uncertainty, which 
propel feelings of sadness and anxiety and decrease feelings of cheerfulness (Bringmann et al., 
2013; Hong & Cheung, 2015; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). High neuroticism and 
Anxiety/Depression are also marked by lower emotional granularity and clarity (Barrett, 2018; 
Carstensen et al., 2000; Luminet et al., 1999).  
Next to the neurotic cascade, high neuroticism scores are also reflected in the way 
adolescents think and talk about themselves and construct their life narratives, as people vary 
in their emotional tone, themes, and complexity, which are fundamental aspects of our 
personality. High-neurotic people report more negatively toned biographical scenes, with more 
sadness and distress (but not more expressions of fear/anxiety), more negative inferences about 
themselves or others, more contamination sequences (i.e., good scenes that end poorly for them, 
which are associated with depression), less agency, and lower recall of specific positive 
memories (e.g., McAdams, 2015; Singer et al., 2013). Narrative identities subsume tasks, goals, 
projects, tactics, defences, values, and other developmental, motivational, and/or strategic 
concerns that contextualize individual lives in time, context, and social roles (McAdams, 2010, 
2015). Such meaning-making processes are hallmark of the neuroticism system and treatment 
strategies (Hong & Cheung, 2015; Roberts et al., 2017) may influence how adolescents 
experience reality (Laceulle et al., 2015). 
Dynamic perspectives 
Personality traits like neuroticism are often understood as dynamic equilibria (i.e., “attractor 
basin” or “set-point”) around which micro- and meso-level elements fluctuate in response to 
life experiences (Fleeson & Jajawickreme, 2015; Fleeson & Law, 2015; Jeronimus et al., 2013; 
Ormel et al., 2017). Also the attractor landscape itself changes under influence of experiences, 
as neuroticism and anxiety/depression basins often become less deep after we take on new social 
roles such as worker or parent (Bleidorn et al., 2013; Roberts et al., 2006; Mund et al., 2018), 
but deepen in response to stressful life events (especially social stress and conflict) that can be 
characterized as unpredictable, uncontrollable, unexpected, undesirable, and non-normative 
from a life history perspective (Jeronimus, 2015). The components of the dynamic system 
deviate from their balanced configuration (in level or contingencies) until the old or a new 
homeostatic equilibrium is found.  
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Rapid increases in the facets anxiety and depression after stressful experiences (in terms 
of weeks and months) can be followed by slower external adaptation processes in our personal 
environment (in terms of years and decades) after which the affect landscape gravitates slowly 
back to the levels to which one was accustomed, due to substitution in resources, identity, 
habits, social support and social interaction – although these processes can also propel feedback 
loops that prevent regression towards the previous equilibrium, after which the person stabilizes 
in a new attractor (Jeronimus, 2015, p.260; Ormel et al., 2017). These hypotheses about 
developmental processes can be tested in detail when both the individual and the changing 
context are frequently and persistently sampled, but to the best of my knowledge, such high 
resolution data is currently unavailable.  
People are thought to function in a relatively fixed region of a potentially large 
behavioral space, in balance with their environment, resulting in stable personality states 
(Cramer et al., 2012, p.416; Ormel et al., 2017) based on a Pareto-optimal allocation of one’s 
energy budget, when no additional internal or external change can be made without increasing 
the costs somewhere else (e.g., Jeronimus, 2015, p.256). However, continuous small changes 
in our environment require adaptations to maintain this Pareto balance, and such fluctuations 
play out at the micro level. Future studies may unravel the relationship between differences in 
neuroticism and Anxiety or Depression facets and processes underlying dynamic fluctuations 
at the individual level. Whether the variation is over days or years, it is important to comprehend 
what it means for a person to vary from him or herself, and what it means for persons to vary 




Anxiety and depression emerge from dynamic interactions between various affective, cognitive, 
and behavioral elements, which synchronize as emotions (micro), moods (macro), and 
personality traits (meso). In terms of emotions, the dynamic systems perspective supported an 
understanding of anxiety and depression as constructions of the world (rather than reactions to 
it), and suggests that changes in emotion dynamics can serve as warning signals for the 
development of a mood disorder, which could be highly valuable for prevention strategies. 
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Although multiple studies support the existence of rapid transitions between normal and mood 
states, there is a dearth of literature that covers such transitions at the individual level.  
Dynamic constructivist perspectives and evidence for connections between various 
anxiety and depression symptoms provided the field with a new explanation for the frequent 
co-occurrence of anxiety and depression states. Neuroticism was identified as a broad meso-
level attractor basin that is stabilized via “the neurotic cascade” and describes our inner climate, 
which makes some adolescents more prone to experience negative emotions including anxiety 
and depression, and more vulnerable to develop anxiety and depression disorders. The young 
age of onset for most anxiety and depression problems suggest that it would be cost-effective 
to influence these meso-level processes before adolescents let symptoms of anxiety and/or 
depression cascade into other spheres of functioning and the attractor landscape “stabilizes.”  
Promising future avenues to improve our understanding of states of anxiety and 
depression include challenging studies that test various dynamic processes in single adolescents 
and examine changes therein over time. These studies ideally connect processes across multiple 
time scales, from real-time affective experiences, to the emergence of emotions and of emotion 
dysfunctions (which requires high-frequency sampling), and the development of symptoms of 
anxiety and depression and mood problems (which should be assessed in terms of weeks and 
months) and tendencies and personal narratives (in terms of years and decades). Only studies 
that capture all three levels (emotion, mood, personality) can illustrate how various emotion 
components synchronize and enable for the emergence of the macro and meso levels, which in 
turn influence and constrain the emotions and moods we experience – a circular causality that 
is the hallmark of the complex dynamic system that evolves within each of us. 
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